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CANADA'S ROE: THE CANADIAN 
ABORTION DECISION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND 
THEORY 
Daniel 0. Conkle* 
Like the United Kingdom, Canada traditionally has been com-
mitted to the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, which leaves 
little room for judicial protection of individual rights. In 1982, 
however, the Canadian Constitution, originally a product of the 
United Kingdom, was "patriated" to Canada. It was also amended 
to include a judicially-enforceable Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
This amendment gave the Supreme Court of Canada a power of 
judicial review analogous to that of the Supreme Court of the 
United States. Nonetheless, one might have expected the Canadian 
Supreme Court to move cautiously, narrowly interpreting the Char-
ter and giving considerable deference to the policy judgments of the 
federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures. 
Despite its institutional heritage of deference to the legislature, 
however, the Canadian Supreme Court has embraced an activist 
role in the protection of individual rights. It has ruled that it will 
not be bound by evidence of original intent, and it has invalidated 
numerous legislative and administrative actions found to violate 
Charter provisions. Perhaps most remarkably, the Court has en-
dorsed a doctrine analogous to American substantive due process, 
breathing substantive content into the general language of Section 7 
of the Charter, a provision that apparently was designed to provide 
purely procedural protection. Relying on Section 7, moreover, the 
Canadian Supreme Court has already decided the Canadian version 
of Roe v. Wade. In Morgentaler v. The Queen,t the Court invali-
dated a long-standing abortion statute and thereby granted consti-
tutional protection to the abortion decisions of Canadian women. 
Morgentaler may be the most prominent example of judicial 
• Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. I wish to 
thank Lauren K. Robel for her helpful comments on an earlier version of this Article. 
I. (1988) I S.C.R. 30 (Can. 1988). 
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activism under the Charter. At the same time, however, the Court's 
decision contains significant elements of judicial restraint. The 
Court's rationale is limited, and it might permit a revised statute 
imposing substantial restrictions on abortion rights. The legitimacy 
of the Court's decision also is enhanced by two significant Charter 
provisions that have no analogues in the United States. On the one 
hand, the Charter explicitly authorizes judicial review and the re-
sulting invalidation of legislation. On the other hand, it contains a 
"notwithstanding" clause that permits Parliament or a provincial 
legislature to enact legislation that is not subject to invalidation 
under specified provisions of the Charter, including Section 7. If 
Parliament were willing to invoke this provision, it could effectively 
"overrule" the Morgentaler decision with ordinary legislation. 
In this article, I will first describe the Canadian Supreme 
Court's emerging constitutional jurisprudence, including its inter-
pretation of Section 7. I will then discuss Morgentaler itself. Fi-
nally, I will offer some observations on the Canadian experience and 
its implications for constitutional law and theory in the United 
States. 
I 
Even before 1982, Canada had a Constitution and an in-
dependent judiciary with the power of judicial review. Since 1867, 
Canada's pre-Charter Constitution has delineated the relative pow-
ers of the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures. As a 
result, Canadian courts have exercised judicial review on questions 
of federalism for more than a century. With a few exceptions, how-
ever, the pre-Charter Constitution did not protect individual rights, 
leaving the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy essentially intact. 
In 1960, the Canadian Parliament adopted a statutory bill of 
rights. This bill of rights, however, had significant limitations. 
First, as a statutory enactment it was subject to repeal at Parlia-
ment's discretion. Second, it applied only to federal laws, not to 
provincial legislation. Finally, when reviewing federal legislation, 
the Supreme Court of Canada exercised great caution in applying 
the bill of rights.z In 1975, for example, the Court summarily re-
jected a bill of rights challenge to the same abortion statute it later 
invalidated in Morgentaler.3 
2. See generally, P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 639-47 (2d ed. 1985). 
3. This 1975 decision bore the same name as the Court's 1988 decision invalidating the 
statute. See Morgentaler v. The Queen, [1976] I S.C.R. 616 (Can. 1975). In this first 
Morgentaler case, the Court, without even hearing arguments in opposition, unanimously 
and summarily rejected the bill of rights arguments that had been advanced. See id. at 658. 
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The I982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms has largely sup-
planted the I960 Canadian Bill of Rights. Unlike the bill of rights, 
the Charter applies to legislative and administrative action at both 
the federal and the provincial levels, and it can be changed only by a 
difficult process of constitutional amendment. Patterned on Ameri-
can constitutional provisions, international covenants, and Can-
ada's pre-existing statutory bill of rights, the Charter contains an 
extensive listing of protected individual rights. For example, the 
Charter protects freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of ex-
pression and association, freedom from unreasonable search or 
seizure, and the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treat-
ment or punishment. It also protects a number of procedural rights 
for those accused of criminal violations, as well as the right to equal 
protection of the law. These rights are not protected absolutely. 
Instead, Section I of the Charter contains a "justification" provi-
sion, which states that Charter rights are subject to "such reason-
able limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society." 
The Supreme Court of Canada could have interpreted Sec-
tion I to mandate judicial deference to legislative enactments chal-
lenged under the Charter. Such deference would have permitted 
some continuity with the Canadian tradition of parliamentary 
supremacy, and could have been supported by judicial precedents 
under the Canadian Bill of Rights. But the Court has rejected that 
approach. Noting that Section I applies only to laws prescribing 
"limits" on Charter rights, the Court has held there can be no justi-
fication for laws in "direct conflict" with such rights.4 In other 
cases involving Section I, the Court has applied a two-step analysis. 
First, the Court must determine whether the challenged law in-
fringes a right protected by the Charter. If it finds such an infringe-
ment, the Court then must decide whether the law is nonetheless 
justified under Section I, with the government bearing the burden of 
justification.s The Court has read Section I to require a "stringent 
standard of justification"6 and a burden of proof that "must be ap-
plied rigorously." 7 More generally, the Court has framed its in-
quiry in terms analogous to the United States Supreme Court's 
See also id. at 624 (Laskin. C.J .. dissenting on other grounds). Chief Justice Laskin later 
explained why. in his view. these arguments were so obviously without merit. See id. at 628-
37. 
4. Attorney General of Quebec v. Quebec Ass"n of Protestant School Bds .. [1984] 2 
S.C.R. 66. 88 (Can. 1984). 
5. See The Queen v. Oakes. [1986] I S.C.R. 103. 135-37 (Can. 1986). 
6. !d. at 136. 
7. !d. at 137. 
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"strict scrutiny," 8 and it has suggested that "utilitarian" arguments 
will be met with considerable skepticism.9 
The Court could also have limited the Charter's reach by refer-
ence to the "legislative history" of its enactment. Whatever the the-
oretical appeal of such an approach in the United States, two 
circumstances surrounding the Charter's adoption provide addi-
tional arguments in its favor. First, the history of the Charter is 
thorough and accessible, 10 as compared to the scant historical rec-
ord concerning most of the individual rights provisions of the 
United States Constitution. Second, the Charter's "history" is re-
cent, so there is little room for a "changed circumstances" argu-
ment for departing from the original understanding of its 
provisions. 
Here again, however, the Canadian Supreme Court has re-
jected a plausible limitation on its interpretive role, holding that the 
Charter's "legislative history" should be given "minimal weight" in 
the Court's interpretive process. 11 In support of this holding, the 
Court stated that it was "nearly impossible" to determine "the in-
tention of the legislative bodies which adopted the Charter."I2 And 
even if it could determine such an intention, the Court was unwill-
ing to render "the rights, freedoms and values embodied in the 
Charter ... frozen in time to the moment of adoption with little or 
no possibility of growth, development and adjustment to changing 
societal needs." u The Court described the Charter as a "living 
tree" that must be permitted to grow through judicial interpreta-
tion: "If the newly planted 'living tree' which is the Charter is to 
have the possibility of growth and adjustment over time, care must 
be taken to ensure that historical materials . . . do not stunt its 
growth."I4 
So, too, in its consideration of other issues, the Canadian 
Supreme Court has given an expansive reading to the Charter's pro-
tection of individual rights, a reading that assures the Court an ac-
tivist, counter-majoritarian role in Canadian society. In construing 
Charter provisions patterned on the Canadian Bill of Rights, for 
8. See id. at 138-40. 
9. This was suggested by the opinion for three Justices in Singh v. Minister of Employ-
ment & Immigration. (1985]1 S.C.R. 177.218-20 (Can. 1985) (opinion of Wilson, J.). (The 
remaining three Justices participating in Singh based their decision on the Canadian Bill of 
Rights, without reaching any Charter issues.) 
10. See P. HOGG, supra note 2. at 343-44. 
II. ReSection 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486. 507-09 (Can. 1985). 
12. !d. at 508-09. 
13. !d. at 509. 
14. !d. See generally, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker. [1984]1 S.C.R. 357, 
365-68 (Can. 1984). 
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example, the Court has refused to be bound by pre-Charter prece-
dents that it now regards as insufficiently protective of the individ-
ual rights in question.l5 More generally, the Court has declared 
that the Charter calls for "the unremitting protection of individual 
rights and liberties," which the judiciary must ensure as "the guard-
ian of the constitution." lo 
The Canadian Supreme Court's activist stance extends beyond 
its interpretation of Charter provisions that are relatively specific. 
In addition to these specific provisions, Section 7 of the Charter 
provides that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accord-
ance with the principles of fundamental justice." Even before 
Morgentaler, the Canadian Supreme Court had established that this 
section would be given a broad reading. 
Like the due process clauses of the United States Constitution, 
Section 7 contains two elements: It first describes certain protected 
interests, and it then declares that these interests are not to be de-
prived unless stated conditions are satisfied. Because Section 7 is 
further subject to the "justification" provision of Section 1, the con-
stitutional analysis of a Section 7 challenge entails three questions: 
(1) Has there been a deprivation of "life," "liberty," or "security of 
the person" within the meaning of Section 7? (2) If so, did the dep-
rivation occur in violation of "the principles of fundamental jus-
tice"? (3) If so, can the government nonetheless justify the 
deprivation under the justification provision of Section 1? 17 
Despite their similarities, Section 7 differs in significant re-
spects from the American due process clauses. In particular, its 
protected interests do not include "property," and the protection 
provided is stated in terms of "fundamental justice" rather than 
"due process of law." Those who framed and adopted the Cana-
dian Charter were acting against the backdrop of American sub-
stantive due process, and they apparently did not like what they 
saw. They clearly wanted to avoid the possibility of a Lochner-like 
protection of economic rights. More generally, it appears that they 
wished to avoid substantive due process altogether. 
As recently as 1975, the Chief Justice of the Canadian Supreme 
15. E.g .. ReSection 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act, (1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 509-11 (Can. 
1985); The Queen v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] I S.C.R. 295. 341-44 (Can. 1985). 
16. Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984]2 S.C.R. 145, 155 (Can. 1984). The Court's activist 
rhetoric and decisionmaking have been tempered to a degree in some of its more recent cases. 
See Petter & Monahan, Developments in Constitutional Law: The !986-87 Term, 10 SteP. CT. 
L. REV. 61 (1988). 
17. See generally ReSection 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act, (1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (Can. 
1985). 
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Court described the notion of substantive due process as "foreign to 
our constitutional traditions, to our constitutional law and to our 
conceptions of judicial review."ts And at least according to impor-
tant evidence from the legislative history of its adoption, Section 7 
was designed to keep it that way. Testifying in 1981 before Parlia-
ment's Special Joint Committee on the Constitution, several high-
ranking officials of the Canadian Department of Justice suggested 
that Section 7 would "cover the same thing as what is called proce-
dural due process, that is the meaning of due process in relation to 
requiring fair procedure ... [but would] not cover the concept of 
what is called substantive due process, which would impose sub-
stantive requirements as to [the] policy of the law in question. "t9 
These officials indicated that Section 7 therefore would not con-
strain the substantive judgments of Parliament on matters such as 
abortion and capital punishment, "the two main examples that we 
should keep in mind. "2o Speaking without contradiction from other 
witnesses or from members of the committee,21 they testified that 
"fundamental justice" was essentially synonymous with "natural 
justice" under pre-existing Canadian law.22 Despite the potential 
breadth of each of these terms, "natural justice" in fact was a term 
of art with a well-defined meaning in Canadian law, one that was 
limited to purely procedural considerations. If "fundamental jus-
tice" had been read to mean "natural justice," Section 7's protection 
would have been limited to the equivalent of procedural due 
process. 
To date, the Supreme Court of Canada has rejected a Lochner-
like role.23 But the Court otherwise has embraced a broad reading 
of Section 7. In particular, it has rejected the historical evidence 
limiting "fundamental justice" to the procedural protections of 
"natural justice,"24 noting that "[i]t was, after all, clearly open to 
18. Morgentaler v. The Queen, [1976) I S.C.R. 616, 632 (Can. 1975) (Laskin, C.J., 
dissenting). On the point in question, this was hardly a "dissenting" opinion. To the con-
trary, Chief Justice Laskin was explaining why the Court, in this first Morgenta/er case, had 
unanimously and summarily rejected a Canadian Bill of Rights challenge to the same abor-
tion statute that the Court would later invalidate in its 1988 Morgen taler ruling. See gener-
ally note 3 supra and accompanying text. 
19. ReSection 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act, [1985) 2 S.C.R. 486, 504 (Can. 1985) (quot-
ing testimony of Mr. Strayer). 
20. Morgentaler v. The Queen, [1988) I S.C.R. 30, 144 (Can. 1988) (Mcintyre, J., dis-
senting) (quoting testimony of Mr. Chretien). 
21. SeeP. HoGG, supra note 2, at 747. 
22. See Re Section 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act, [1985) 2 S.C.R. 486, 504-05 (Can. 
1985). 
23. See Attorney General of Quebec v. Irwin Toy Limited, No. 20074, slip op. at 83-85 
(Can. Apr. 27, 1989). 
24. See ReSection 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act, [1985) 2 S.C.R. at 504-09. 
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the legislator to use the term natural justice, a known term of art, 
but such was not done. "2s Instead, in a ruling that seems to disre-
gard "the unmistakable intentions of the framers,"26 the Court has 
found that Section 7 limits the substance of legislative policy as well 
as the process by which that policy is enforced. 
Prior to Morgentaler, then, the Canadian Supreme Court-in 
the face of a powerful argument to the contrary-had held that Sec-
tion 7 imposes substantive restrictions analogous to American sub-
stantive due process. Moreover, the Court had decided cases in 
which it had assumed that Section 7, like American due process, 
might provide special protection for personal decisionmaking in the 
family setting and with respect to procreative choices.21 The Cana-
dian stage had quickly been set for a constitutional ruling on the 
question of abortion. 
II 
Morgentaler v. The Queen presented a challenge to Section 251 
of the Criminal Code of Canada. Under Section 251, abortion is a 
criminal offense at any stage of pregnancy, unless it falls within a 
"therapeutic abortion" exception. To fall within this exception, the 
abortion must be undertaken in an "accredited or approved hospi-
tal" and must be approved in advance by a "therapeutic abortion 
committee" acting in accordance with specified procedures and 
standards. Such a committee, composed of three or more physi-
cians, is authorized to approve an abortion by another physician 
when "in its opinion the continuation of the pregnancy of [the wo-
man] would or would be likely to endanger her life or health." 
Through Section 251 and its predecessor statutes, Canadian crimi-
nal law has contained a general prohibition on abortion for Can-
ada's entire history as a Confederation, which dates from 1867; the 
"therapeutic abortion" defense that is now a part of Section 251 is 
the result of a liberalizing amendment enacted in 1969.28 
Both the trial court and the lower appellate court in 
Morgentaler upheld Section 251. In a unanimous decision, the On-
25. /d. at 503. 
26. Monahan & Petter, Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1985-86 Term, 9 SUP. 
CT. L. REv. 69, 72 (1987). See also id. at 78-102. 
27. See Jones v. The Queen, [1986]2 S.C.R. 284. 302 (Can. 1986) (opinion of La Forest, 
J.) (assuming, without deciding, that Section 7 "liberty" includes "the right of parents to 
educate their children as they see fit"); Eve v. Mrs. E, [ 1986] 2 S.C.R. 388, 436 (Can. 1986) 
(assuming, without deciding, that Section 7 "liberty" includes "a fundamental right to bear 
children [and] a fundamental right to choose not to have children and to implement that 
choice by means of contraception"). 
28. See Morgentaler v. The Queen, [1988]1 S.C.R. 30, 136, 144-46 (Can. 1988) (Mcin-
tyre, J., dissenting). See also id. at 85-86 (opinion of Beetz, J.). 
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tario Court of Appeal found that the Charter-based attack on the 
statute feared no better than the bill of rights challenge the Cana-
dian Supreme Court had rejected in 1975.29 The Court of Appeal 
noted that the right to abortion was not "deeply rooted in our tradi-
tions and way of life. "3o It stated that substantive review under 
Section 7 should be limited to "exceptional cases where there has 
been a marked departure" from norms of civil or criminal liabil-
ity ,3t and that this was not such a case. 
The Canadian Supreme Court reversed. Finding its earlier bill 
of rights precedent to be largely beside the point, the Court ruled 
that Section 251 violated Section 7 of the Charter and could not be 
justified under Section 1. The Court reached this result in a five-to-
two decision, but with no majority rationale. Instead, the Justices 
produced three separate opinions supporting the Court's invalida-
tion of the statute, along with one opinion in dissent.32 
Each of the three opinions supporting the Court's judgment 
proceeded through the three-step analysis required in a Section 7 
case. Speaking for himself and Justice Lamer, Chief Justice Dick-
son first determined that Section 251 deprived pregnant women of 
their Section 7 interest in "security of the person"; the statute inter-
fered with women's bodies and imposed physical risks and psycho-
logical harms, caused in part by the statutorily effected delay in 
securing even "therapeutic abortions" within the statutory de-
fense.33 Second, he concluded that this deprivation was not in ac-
cordance with "the principles of fundamental justice." Based on an 
extensive examination of testimony and other evidence, he found 
that the procedures necessary to obtain lawful "therapeutic abor-
tions" not only caused significant delays for women seeking such 
abortions, but operated inequitably and unfairly, making these 
abortions all but impossible for many women to obtain.34 And it 
violated fundamental justice, he concluded, for Parliament to create 
a defense that is "illusory or so difficult to attain as to be practically 
illusory." 35 
As for Section 1, Chief Justice Dickson wrote that Section 251 
passed scrutiny at the "ends" level, being supported by the objective 
of protecting both fetal life and the competing interests of pregnant 
29. See generally supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
30. Regina v. Morgentaler, 52 O.R.2d 353, 378 (Ont. Ct. App. 1985). 
31. !d. at 385. 
32. Taken together, the opinions are approximately 140 pages in length. 
33. Morgentaler, [1988] I S.C.R. at 53-63 (opinion of Dickson, C.J.). 
34. !d. at 57-61, 65-73. See also id. at 91-106 (opinion of Beetz, J.). 
35. Jd. at 70 (opinion of Dickson, C.J.). Although he affirmed that "fundamental jus-
tice" includes a substantive component, Chief Justice Dickson claimed that his "illusory de-
fense" rationale was procedural in nature. !d. at 53, 63, 73. 
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women.J6 Focusing again on the "therapeutic abortion" defense, 
however, he concluded that the law failed at the "means" level be-
cause it called for procedures that were "often arbitrary and unfair" 
and because it held out "an illusory defence to many women who 
would prima facie qualify" for its protection.J7 He noted that in its 
actual operation, the statute was not well-suited to further one of 
the interests that it was designed to protect, namely, the life and 
health of pregnant women.Js 
Justice Beetz, joined by Justice Estey, agreed that Section 251 
was unconstitutional. Like Chief Justice Dickson, Justice Beetz de-
termined that the statute infringed the "security of the person" of 
pregnant women, that this infringement was not in accordance with 
"fundamental justice," and that it could not be justified under Sec-
tion 1. He, too, focused on the defense provisions of the statute, 
finding certain of the mandated procedures "manifestly unfair" and 
"unnecessary."J9 But he went further. Although he recognized 
that Parliament has a "pressing and substantial" concern with the 
protection of fetal life,40 he found this interest could not prevail 
over the life and health of pregnant women.4I As a result, accord-
ing to Justice Beetz, Parliament could not avoid the constitutional 
deficiencies in Section 251 by adopting an absolute prohibition on 
abortion. Instead, the Charter mandated some type of defense for 
abortions undertaken to protect the life or health of pregnant 
women.42 
Justice Wilson also supported the Court's judgment, but for 
reasons considerably different from those of the other four Justices 
in the majority. She first determined that Section 251 deprived 
pregnant women of "liberty" as well as "security of the person," 
this because "liberty" under Section 7 includes "personal autonomy 
over important decisions intimately affecting [the women's] private 
lives,"4J including decisions with respect to abortion.44 Second, she 
36. !d. at 75. 
37. !d. 
38. !d. at 75-76. 
39. !d. at 110 (opinion of Beetz, J.). See also id. at 114-22. 
40. !d. at 124. 
41. Interestingly enough, Justice Beetz reached this conclusion on the basis of Section 
251 itself. He stated that the defense provisions of Section 251 recognized that the life or 
health of a pregnant woman must take precedence over the interest in protecting fetal life 
when "the continuation of the pregnancy of [the woman] would or would be likely to endan-
ger her life or health," and that, with the adoption of the Charter, this became entrenched as 
at least a minimum standard for protecting the rights of a pregnant woman under Section 7. 
!d. at 85-89. 
42. !d. at 125-28. 
43. !d. at 171 (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
44. See id. at 162-74. 
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found this deprivation inconsistent with "fundamental justice," but 
primarily because it violated "freedom of conscience," which is in-
dependently guaranteed by Section 2(a) of the Charter. According 
to Justice Wilson, if a statute infringes a right guaranteed elsewhere 
in the Charter, it cannot be in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice, and it therefore violates Section 7 as well as the 
more specific Charter provision.4s Finally, Justice Wilson con-
cluded that Section 251 could not be justified under Section 1 of the 
Charter. Although she conceded that the protection of fetal life 
might be permissible in the later stages of pregnancy, she noted that 
Section 251 "takes the [abortion] decision away from the woman at 
all stages of her pregnancy,"46 and she concluded that this could 
not be defended on the basis of Section 1.47 
Joined by Justice La Forest, Justice Mcintyre dissented from 
what he viewed as the majority's illegitimate judicial policymaking. 
He argued that in the exercise of judicial review under the Charter, 
Canadian courts "must confine themselves to such democratic val-
ues as are clearly found and expressed in the Charter and refrain 
from imposing or creating other values not so based."4s "The prop-
osition that women enjoy a constitutional right to have an abor-
tion," he wrote, "is devoid of support" in the language and history 
of the constitutional text.49 Noting the long record of abortion pro-
hibition in Canada, he also concluded that such a proposed right 
found no support in "the history, traditions and underlying philoso-
phies of our society."so Justice Mcintyre rejected the majority's 
conclusion that Section 7 protected such a right,si and he therefore 
saw no need to reach the question of justification under Section 1. 
As Justice Mcintyre's dissenting opinion suggests, Morgentaler 
may be the most dramatic example thus far of judicial activism 
under the Charter. Relying on vague and ambiguous constitutional 
provisions and on reasoning not limited by the history of the Char-
ter, the Canadian Supreme Court invalidated a prohibition on abor-
tion that had been in effect for more than a century, and that 
Parliament had reaffirmed-albeit with a liberalizing amendment-
less than two decades before the Court's decision. 
At the same time, however, the Court's decision contains sig-
45. /d. at 174-80. 
46. /d. at 183 (emphasis in original). 
47. !d. at 180-84. 
48. /d. at 137-38 (Mcintyre, J., dissenting). 
49. /d. at 143-44. 
50. /d. at 144. See id. at 144-46. 
51. He also disputed the claim that Section 251 violated fundamental justice by holding 
out an "illusory" defense. /d. at 149-55. 
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nificant elements of judicial restraint. Although it invalidates Sec-
tion 251, the decision does not preclude the adoption of a new 
abortion statute. Of the seven justices participating in Morgentaler, 
the two dissenters, Justices Mcintyre and La Forest, obviously 
showed no hostility toward new legislation. Chief Justice Dickson 
and Justice Lamer voted to invalidate Section 251 on the basis of an 
extremely limited rationale, indeed, one that might permit a statute 
even more restrictive of abortion rights, as long as it does not hold 
out an "illusory" exception. The opinions of these four justices-a 
majority of those participating in Morgentaler-therefore do not 
foreclose the adoption of a new abortion statute that is quite restric-
tive of abortion rights, conceivably to the point of banning abortion 
altogether. In contrast, Justices Beetz and Estey specifically stated 
that they would not approve a total ban on abortion. But they did 
suggest that they might approve an abortion regulation protecting 
fetal life, as long as it also protected the life and health of pregnant 
women and avoided the unfairness that had resulted under Section 
251.52 Even Justice Wilson, who wrote the opinion most protective 
of abortion rights, suggested that Parliament could restrict abortion 
in the later part of pregnancy based on "the informed judgment of 
the legislature which is in a position to receive guidance on the sub-
ject from all the relevant disciplines. "sJ 
Whether or not entirely by design, the Canadian Supreme 
Court, through its decision in Morgentaler, effectively has "re-
manded" the issue of abortion to Parliament. Indeed, the "re-
mand" is one that leaves the issue open to a variety of possible 
resolutions, none of which is clearly required or precluded by the 
Court's ruling. These possible resolutions range all the way from an 
unlimited right to abortion, which presently exists as a result of the 
invalidation of Section 251, to a total ban on abortion, which might 
not be foreclosed by the Court's decision. The three opinions sup-
porting the judgment in Morgen taler provide important information 
concerning how each Justice in the majority might assess the vari-
ous sorts of abortion regulations that Parliament might now adopt, 
but none of them purports to give clear-cut guidance. Adding to 
the uncertainty, no more than two Justices joined any one of these 
three opinions, and two additional Justices were in dissent. More-
over, the membership of the Canadian Supreme Court has changed 
52. See id. at 106-12 (opinion ofBeetz. J.). This suggestion was not unambiguous; these 
Justices also left open the possibility that in a future case, they might find that personal 
decisions concerning abortion implicate .. liberty .. as well as .. security of the person ... and that 
such a finding might require an unlimited right to abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. 
Seeid. at 112-14. 
53. !d. at 183 (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
310 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 6:299 
significantly in the short time since it decided Morgentaler.54 Thus, 
in future abortion cases, new Justices will be participating, and their 
views on the relevant constitutional issues have not yet been 
disclosed. 
The Court's open-ended "remand," however, was accompa-
nied by a thorough venting of the abortion issue. Although the Jus-
tices did not speak with one voice, they collectively presented 
Parliament with an eloquent and thoughtful account of the compet-
ing interests at stake. Each of the opinions in the majority, for ex-
ample, gave serious weight to a woman's freedom from 
governmental interference on a matter that directly affects not only 
her body but also her future life. Justice Beetz emphasized a wo-
man's interest in protecting her physical health and life. Chief Jus-
tice Dickson spoke more broadly, noting that a prohibition on 
abortion can force a woman to deny "her own priorities and aspira-
tions."55 Justice Wilson, speaking even more broadly, described a 
woman's abortion decision as a matter intimately tied to the wo-
man's self-identity and sense of being: A woman's decision whether 
to have an abortion, wrote Justice Wilson, is "one that will have 
profound psychological, economic and social consequences" for 
her, "a decision that deeply reflects the way the woman thinks 
about herself and her relationship to others and to society at 
large. "56 To make her "the passive recipient of a decision made by 
others as to whether her body is to be used to nurture a new life," 
Justice Wilson argued, would be to infringe the woman's most basic 
right to "human dignity and self-respect. "57 
The Justices' opinions expressed concern not only for protect-
ing the interests of pregnant women, but also for protecting the lives 
of developing fetuses. Justice Mcintyre's dissenting opinion re-
counted a long-standing Canadian commitment to the unborn and a 
correlative rejection of unlimited abortion rights: "There has al-
ways been clear recognition of a public interest in the protection of 
the unborn and there has been no evidence or indication of any gen-
54. Although the Canadian Supreme Court has nine members, only seven participated 
in .Morgentaler. Three of these seven-Justices Beetz. Estey, and Mcintyre-since have re-
tired and been replaced by new Justices. Justice Le Dain, who did not participate in 
Jforgentaler, also has recently retired and been replaced. See Fraser. New Justice Sopinka 
Warns Against Trying to Classify Him, Globe & Mail (Toronto), June 24, 1988, at AS, col. I; 
MacCharles, Two Get Supreme Welcome: Protecting Rights Seen as Judges' Toughest Chal-
lenge, Ottawa Citizen, Feb. 2, 1989, at A3, col. I; MacCharles, Top Court Appointment Caps 
Judge's Rapid Rise, Ottawa Citizen, Mar. 31, 1989. at AI, col. 5. 
55. Morgentaler, [1988] I S.C.R. at 56-57 (opinion of Dickson, C.J.). 
56. !d. at 171 (opinion of Wilson. J. ). 
57. /d. at 173. 
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eral acceptance of the concept of abortion at will in our society."ss 
Each of the opinions in the majority agreed that the interest in pro-
tecting fetal life was extremely important. Justice Beetz, for exam-
ple, described the interest as one of "pressing and substantial" 
concern,s9 and Justice Wilson conceded that protection of the fetus 
was "a perfectly valid" objective that might prevail over the right to 
abortion after a certain point in pregnancy. 60 Indeed, the Court 
even left open the possibility that fetal life itself might be entitled to 
some protection under Section 7 of the Charter.6t 
The decision in Morgentaler, then, was a blend of judicial ac-
tivism and restraint. With little support from the text or history of 
the Charter, the Canadian Supreme Court entered the controversial 
field of abortion and promptly upset the legal status quo. But the 
Court's decision, in effect, was a "provisional" ruling, a ruling that 
invited Parliament to reconsider the question of abortion, perhaps 
with a more informed and thoughtful understanding of the relevant 
competing interests. 
To date, Parliament's response to the Court's invitation has 
been halting, and the future of the abortion issue in Canada remains 
uncertain. In the aftermath of Morgentaler, Parliament vigorously 
debated the abortion question and examined a variety of policy op-
tions, but it was unable to muster majority support for any of the 
alternatives it considered.62 Later, the Government postponed fur-
ther legislative initiatives pending the Canadian Supreme Court's 
resolution of another abortion case, Borowski v. Attorney General of 
Canada.63 
Addressing an issue left open in Morgentaler, the challenger in 
Borowski had argued that a fetus is within Section 7's protection of 
"everyone" and therefore is entitled to constitutional protection of 
its own.64 On this reasoning, the challenger had contended that 
Section 251, with its "therapeutic abortion" defense, was unduly 
58. /d. at 146 (Mcintyre, J., dissenting). 
59. /d. at 124 (opinion of Beetz, J.). 
60. /d. at 181-83 (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
61. See id. at 74 (opinion of Dickson, C.J.); id. at 128 (opinion of Beetz, J.); id. at 184 
(opinion of Wilson. J.). 
62. See Burns, Canadian Legislators at Impasse on Abortion, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1988, 
at 3, col. 2; Fraser, MPs Vote Down Abortion Resolution, Globe & Mail (Toronto), July 29, 
1988, at AI, col. I. 
63. No. 20411 (Can. Mar. 9, 1989). Earlier, the Government had asked the Canadian 
Supreme Court to delay its consideration of Borowski until after Parliament had adopted new 
abortion legislation, but this request had been denied. See Borowski, slip op. at 6; Fraser, Top 
Court Refuses to Delay Hearing on Rights of Fetus, Globe & Mail (Toronto), July 20, 1988, at 
AI, col. I. 
64. The challenger also had argued that fetal rights should be protected under the 
equality provisions of Section IS of the Charter. 
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permissive in the regulation of abortion. The Government awaited 
the Court's decision in Borowski based on an apparent belief that 
the Court might provide a more definitive constitutional ruling to 
guide and constrain Parliament's legislative decisionmaking.6s To 
the contrary, however, the Court found the Borowski case moot in 
light of Morgentaler's invalidation of Section 251 and Parliament's 
failure to adopt new legislation. In effect, the Court chose to leave 
intact its inconclusive and "provisional" ruling in Morgentaler, 
thereby renewing its invitation for Parliament to take the next step 
in resolving the abortion question.66 
In the wake of Borowski, the Government has indicated that it 
will proceed deliberately and with caution as it gives renewed con-
sideration to the issue of abortion.67 An influential commission has 
suggested compromise legislation that would be relatively permis-
sive early in pregnancy, but substantially more restrictive for abor-
tions after twenty-two weeks.6s The Government, however, has yet 
to endorse this or any other legislative proposal, and it might even 
choose not to propose new legislation at all, leaving the right to 
abortion unregulated by the criminal law. 69 
For present purposes, the actual response of Parliament is less 
important than its power to respond. Indeed, even if Parliament 
takes no legislative action, its inaction will be a product of demo-
cratic choice, not judicial compulsion. The Supreme Court of Can-
65. See Delacourt & Howard, "Gutless" PM Under Fire for Decision to Wait for Ruling 
on Unborn's Rights, Globe & Mail (Toronto), Aug. 30. 1988, at AI. col. 4. The Govern-
ment's decision to delay might also have been influenced by political considerations, in that it 
permitted Parliament to avoid the abortion issue until after an upcoming federal election. See 
Howard & Delacourt. All Parties "Off the Hook"for Sow as Tories Defer Abortion Decision, 
Globe & Mail (Toronto), Sept. 2. 1988, at A I, col. 2. 
66. Canadian mootness doctrine includes a discretionary component that permits a 
court to decide the merits of a case despite the absence of a live controversy. The Court 
declined to exercise such discretion in Borowski, noting that to do so might "pre-empt a 
possible decision of Parliament by dictating the form of legislation it should enact." Borow-
ski '. Attorney General of Canada, No. 20411, slip op. at 21 (Can. Mar. 9, 1989). 
67. See Kennedy & MacCharles, Court Dodges Fetal Rights, Ottawa Citizen, Mar. 10, 
1989. at AI, col. 5. 
68. Under a proposal of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, a woman could have 
an abortion up to the twenty-second week of pregnancy if her doctor agreed that the abortion 
was necessary to protect the woman's "physical or psychological health." "[A]nnoyance or 
inconvenience" would not be sufficient reason. After twenty-two weeks, an abortion would 
require the approval of two doctors and could be performed only to save the woman's life or 
to protect her against "serious physical injury." The proposal also would permit, at any stage 
of pregnancy. the abortion of a fetus suffering from a "lethal defect" that would result in 
death soon after birth. See Kennedy, Abortion Limits Sought: Commission Urges Govt. to 
Replace Rejecred Law, Ottawa Citizen. Feb. 23, 1989, at A I, col. I. 
69. See Kennedy & MacCharles, supra note 67: Bindman, Governmenr Sri/1 Wavers on 
Abortion, Ottawa Citizen, May 24, 1989, at A4, col. I; Kennedy, PM Brushes Off Queries on 
Aborrion Law, Ottawa Citizen, June 8. 1989, at A3. col. I. 
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ada has made abortion a matter of judicial concern, but it also has 
left the door open for a continuing parliamentary role. 
III 
In any democratic society, judicial review in the protection of 
individual rights raises a profound question of legitimacy, because 
such review stands in obvious tension with majoritarian self-govern-
ment. The legitimacy question is serious even when the judiciary 
relies on specific constitutional language or clear historical evi-
dence. The problem is dramatically compounded, however, when 
courts use vague and ambiguous constitutional language to formu-
late constitutional rights that are largely of the judiciary's own mak-
ing. The most prominent example of this type of creative 
decisionmaking in the United States is the doctrine of substantive 
due process; in Canada, it is the interpretation of Section 7 of the 
Charter. And in their most controversial uses of this type of crea-
tive decisionmaking, the highest courts of both countries have 
granted constitutional protection to the right to abortion. 
Given these parallels, one might argue that the Canadian expe-
rience supports the American experience in this area, in that it con-
firms the legitimacy of creative judicial decisionmaking and the use 
of such decisionmaking to protect abortion rights. But such a con-
clusion would be overdrawn, for the Canadian experience in this 
area is not the same as the American, and the differences have sig-
nificant implications for the legitimacy question. 
The foundation of American judicial review is Marbury v. 
Madison, in which the Supreme Court concluded that the makers of 
the Constitution had implicitly authorized this power when they 
adopted the Constitution some two hundred years ago. Canadian 
judicial review to enforce Charter rights, by contrast, was expressly 
authorized by constitutional amendments enacted in 1982.10 Un-
like those who framed and ratified the United States Constitution, 
moreover, the makers of the Charter acted against the backdrop of 
American judicial review. Although they may not have anticipated 
the Canadian Supreme Court's expansive reading of Section 7, they 
could not have been blind to what the power of judicial review 
might mean. 
As the Canadian Supreme Court itself has observed, "the his-
toric decision to entrench the Charter in our Constitution was taken 
not by the courts but by the elected representatives of the people of 
70. See Constitution Act, 1982. §52(!) (declaring that laws inconsistent with the Char-
ter are "of no force or effect"); id. § 24( l) (authorizing judicial remedies for Charter 
violations). 
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Canada. It was those representatives who extended the scope of 
constitutional adjudication and entrusted the courts with this new 
and onerous responsibility. "7I The adoption of the Charter reflects 
a majoritarian consent to judicial review that is far more explicit, 
far more deliberate, and far more contemporary than any such con-
sent that might be posited for judicial review in the United States.n 
This Canadian consent does much to resolve the question of legiti-
macy in Canada, but it has no relevance in the United States. 
In their authorization of judicial review, those who adopted the 
Canadian Charter fully understood that they were sanctioning a 
counter-majoritarian practice that was fundamentally inconsistent 
with the Canadian tradition of parliamentary supremacy. But they 
were unwilling to sever all ties with that tradition, and, accordingly, 
they adopted the "notwithstanding" provisions of Section 33 of the 
Charter. Under Section 33, most of the basic rights protected by 
the Charter, including those protected by Section 7, are subject to 
legislative override by Parliament or a provincial legislature. Under 
Section 33, a legislative body may "expressly declare" that its enact-
ment "shall operate notwithstanding" a right contained in the 
Charter.7J Section 33 effectively permits Parliament to "overrule" 
judicial decisions with which it disagrees. Thus, for example, Par-
liament could "overrule" Morgentaler by reenacting, with a Section 
33 declaration, the very same abortion statute that the Court 
invalidated. 
Perhaps paradoxically, Section 33 further enhances the legiti-
macy of Canadian judicial review. Section 33 supplements the 
Charter's general authorization of judicial review by providing a 
continuing basis for majoritarian control over most constitutional 
rulings. Although the use of Section 33 may be politically treacher-
ous,74 it gives Parliament and the provincial legislatures an impor-
71. ReSection 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act, (1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 497 (Can. 1985). 
72. Elsewhere I have argued that Congress's consistent failure to exercise its power to 
restrict the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction reflects some measure of popular consent 
to judicial review in the United States. See Conkle, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review in 
Individual Rights Cases: Michael Perry's Constitutional Theory and Beyond, 69 MINN. L. 
REv. 587, 638-58 (1985). But that argument does nothing to negate the comparative point 
that I am making here. 
73. Under Section 33, such a declaration ordinarily expires at the end of a five-year 
period, although it may be extended by re-enactment. 
74. Except. apparently, for the Legislature of Quebec, which has invoked Section 33 on 
numerous occasions. See Bayefsky, The Judicial Function under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, 32 McGILL L.J. 791, 823-25 (1987); Weiler, Rights and Judges in a 
Democracy: A ;\'ew Canadian Version, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 51, 89-91 (1984). Most re-
cently. it invoked Section 33 in the aftermath of Canadian Supreme Court decisions invalidat-
ing Quebec restrictions on the use of languages other than French on public signs. See 
Attorney General of Quebec v. La Chaussure Brown's Inc., (1988]2 S.C.R. 712 (Can. 1988); 
Allan Singer Ltd. v. Attorney General of Quebec, (1988] 2 S.C.R. 790 (Can. 1988). In re-
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tant power that legislative bodies in the United States do not 
possess-the power to "overrule" particular constitutional decisions 
without the need for constitutional amendment. This renders the 
Canadian Supreme Court's decisions less inconsistent with 
majoritarian self-government, and it thereby provides another 
source of legitimacy that has no American analogue. 
If there is a lesson in Morgen taler for the United States, then, it 
is not a lesson in judicial activism. Although the Court gave a 
broad reading to Section 7, its creative constitutional decisionmak-
ing is protected by general legitimating factors that are not present 
in the American constitutional system, and that therefore cannot be 
expected to support the judicial protection of abortion rights in the 
United States. To the contrary, Morgentaler may provide a lesson 
in judicial restraint. Perhaps because of the legitimacy that it de-
rives from the Charter's authorization of judicial review, as well as 
from Section 33, the Canadian Supreme Court quickly has become 
quite activist. In addressing the question of abortion, however, this 
activist court has proceeded with far more caution than its Ameri-
can counterpart. 
In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court, in its first 
major encounter with the abortion question, attempted to provide a 
"final" constitutional answer. It announced a definitive constitu-
tional framework that was broadly protective of abortion rights. 
The Court thereby inhibited what had been a developing political 
debate concerning abortion by moving legislative bodies away from 
a direct consideration of the basic political-moral issues and toward 
an (often duplicitous) consideration of abortion regulations crafted 
to avoid judicial invalidation under Roe. 7 5 Further, the Court's de-
cision polarized debate on the abortion question, contributing to a 
political and judicial climate in which the Court's decision itself 
may soon be overruled. 76 
In Morgentaler, by contrast, the Canadian Supreme Court 
avoided a final constitutional ruling on the abortion question, ren-
dering a decision that was distinctly "provisional" in nature. 
Although the Court invalidated the abortion statute under review, 
its several opinions did little more than open a dialogue with Parlia-
sponse, the Legislature of Quebec promptly adopted new restrictions in legislation that in-
cluded a Section 33 declaration. See Burns, Quebec's French-Only Sign Law Voided, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 16, 1988, at 3, col. 4; Burns, Quebec Offers "Poster War" Compromise, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 19. 1988, at 3, col. 4; Quebec Approves Ban on English Signs, Ottawa Citizen, 
Dec. 22, 1988, at A3, col. I. 
75. See Maltz, Murder in 1he Cathedral-The Supreme Court as Moral Prophet, 8 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 623, 630-31 (1983). 
76. See generally Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L.J. 
215, 237-41 (1987). 
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ment concerning the ultimate resolution of the abortion question in 
Canada. The Court's opinions suggested that Parliament should be 
more sensitive to the interests of pregnant women, but also did not 
discount the importance of protecting fetal life. The Justices pro-
vided insightful and eloquent arguments concerning the interests on 
both sides of this issue, but, at least for the time being, they left it 
largely for Parliament to decide how those arguments should be re-
solved in the adoption of any new abortion statute. 
Given the inherent intractability of the abortion issue, n per-
haps the best we can hope for is a resolution that honors the con-
temporary values of the society in question, regardless of whether 
those values are sound in the ultimate sense of political-moral truth. 
If so, then the role of judges in resolving this issue should be lim-
ited, because they have only a limited ability to tap the contempo-
rary values of the society. On the other hand, there may be reasons 
for judges to upset the legal status quo in this area, thereby forcing 
the political process to do its work afresh. 
Historically, women have been undervalued by society and 
have been under-represented in the political process. In recent 
years, however, conceptions of women and of their proper role in 
the modern world have changed dramatically, and they have begun 
to participate more actively in politics. With these changes have 
come an enhanced understanding of women's interests, including 
their interest in matters of reproduction. For these reasons, dated 
legislation on the question of abortion is not adequate. To ensure a 
proper measurement of contemporary societal values, any legisla-
tive determination of these values must itself be contemporary. 
Further, it must be as thoughtful and considered as possible. Under 
this view, the judiciary has an important, but limited, role: It prop-
erly may invalidate legislation, but only to facilitate a better legisla-
tive judgment on abortion rights, one that reflects a thoughtful 
consideration of the contemporary values of society. 
Unlike Roe, Morgen taler reflects this more cautious, limited ju-
dicial role with respect to abortion. Although Parliament had ad-
dressed the abortion issue as recently as 1969, its decision may not 
have fairly considered the interests of women, 7s and, in any event, 
77. Cf M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW I (1987) (sug-
gesting that this question is one that is "not only unresolved but perhaps not susceptible of 
resolution in any definitive sense"). See generally id. at 10-62 (describing the abortion poli-
cies of a variety of western countries and concluding that the policy of the United States is 
extreme in its protection of abortion rights); ABORTION AND PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN 
FETUS: LEGAL PROBLEMS IN ACROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (S. Frankowski & G. Cole 
ed. 1987) (discussing the divergent abortion policies of various countries). 
78. According to one critical commentator, Parliament's 1969 liberalization of Can-
ada's abortion law went no further than it did because it was premised on a virtually all-male 
1989] CANADIAN ABORTION 317 
the last twenty years may well have brought changes in Canadian 
societal values making Parliament's 1969 decision dated and obso-
lete. And the various opinions in Morgentaler provide important 
arguments for Parliament to consider. If Parliament takes these ar-
guments seriously, "not as the words of an infallible oracle but as a 
prod to [its] own conscientious review of the issues,"79 it will help 
ensure a thoughtful legislative judgment on this extremely difficult 
question. In any event, Morgentaler invites Parliament's participa-
tion in resolving the abortion question in Canada. And this contin-
uing involvement of Parliament ultimately may produce a 
resolution of the abortion question that is both more reflective of 
contemporary societal values and more politically acceptable than a 
purely judicial resolution could ever be. 
In his dissenting opinion in Morgentaler, Justice Mcintyre 
complained that the majority had ignored the primacy of Parlia-
ment in this area: "The solution to this question in this country 
must be left to Parliament. . . . This is not because Parliament can 
claim all wisdom and knowledge but simply because Parliament is 
elected for that purpose in a free democracy and, in addition, has 
the facilities-the exposure to public opinion and information-as 
well as the political power to make effective its decisions."so To be 
sure, the majority did not defer entirely to Parliament. Nonethe-
less, it left far more room for legislative decisionmaking than did 
the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. 
IV 
No country has had a longer experience with judicial review 
than the United States. Many countries, however, learning from 
the American experience, now have adopted this institution. And it 
would be a mistake to conclude that we have nothing to learn in 
return. 
When we look to Canada, we can see that the theoretical legiti-
macy of judicial review need not be the problem that it is in the 
United States. Indeed, Canada has gone a long way toward resolv-
ing this problem through the adoption of constitutional provisions 
that expressly authorize the practice, but that also retain for the 
political process an important means of majoritarian control. And 
we can see that in such a regime, even a judiciary schooled in the 
debate that was infused with an anti-woman bias. See E. PEI RINE. ABORTION IN CANADA 
33-35 (1971). 
79. Russell, The Paradox of Judicial Review, 12 QUEEN'S L.J. 421. 436 (1987). 
80. Morgenta/er, [1988] I S.C.R. at 159 (Mcintyre. J., dissenting). 
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tradition of parliamentary supremacy can quickly take on an ac-
tivist judicial role. 
When we look at Morgentaler in particular, however, we see an 
activist court hestitating, and proceeding with caution, in address-
ing the issue of abortion. Given the continuing tumult that has fol-
lowed Roe v. Wade, it is appropriate to ask whether a more 
cautious, "Canadian" approach might have been advisable in the 
United States. 81 More generally, and looking to the future, it is 
worth considering whether the use of "provisional" rulings, such as 
that in Morgen taler, might be advisable in other controversial areas, 
especially when the challenged legislation is dated or otherwise ap-
pears to conflict with the contemporary values of the society.s2 
81. It is too late in the day for a .. Canadian .. approach to the abortion question in the 
United States. On the other hand, the Canadian experience might have some continuing 
relevance, for it suggests that there should be both legislative and judicial involvement in 
achieving an appropriate resolution of this question. This experience might suggest, there-
fore, that the United States Supreme Court should not abandon Roe by giving the legislatures 
carte blanche in this area, but instead should attempt to preserve some type of continuing 
judicial role, a role designed to promote a thoughtful legislative assessment of contemporary 
societal values. 
82. For examinations of how and when .. provisional judicial review" might appropri-
ately be used in the United States, see P. DIMOND, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL 
CHOICE: THE ROLE OF PROVISIONAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY (1989); Conkle. Non· 
originalist Constitutional Rights and the Problem of Judicial Finality, 13 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 9 (1985). 
As this Article went to press, abortion was returning to center stage in Canada. On 
August 8, 1989, ruling from the bench in an emergency appeal, the Canadian Supreme Court 
reversed a lower court's order, based on provincial law, that had enjoined a woman from 
obtaining an abortion to which her ex-lover had objected. The Court may not issue the rea-
sons for its reversal for several months, but speculation centers on the argument of the federal 
Government, as intervenor, that it alone, and not the provinces, has the authority to prohibit 
abortions and to define exceptions to that prohibition. In any event, it now appears that 
federal abortion legislation will be introduced this fall. See Barron, Canada's Supreme Court 
Rejects Ex-Lover's Effort to Halt Abortion, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1989, at I, col. 5; Weston, 
Govt. Quietly Drafts Abortion Legislation, Ottawa Citizen, Aug. 10, 1989, at AI, col. 1. 
